The productivity effects of multiple pay incentives by Pendleton, A & Robinson, A
Economic and Industrial Democracy
2017, Vol. 38(4) 588 –608
© The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0143831X15583099
journals.sagepub.com/home/eid
The productivity effects of 
multiple pay incentives
Andrew Pendleton
Durham University Business School, UK
Andrew Robinson
Leeds University Business School, UK
Abstract
Drawing on recent incentive theory and the growing use of multiple incentives by firms, this 
article examines the effects of combining incentives on workplace labour productivity. Utilizing 
data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey, the article explores whether 
multiple incentives are more effective than single incentives. It is found that the productivity 
effects of individualized incentives are enhanced by profit sharing though not by collective 
payment by result schemes (PBR). Profit sharing also enhances the effect of collective PBR, and it 
is found that two group incentives are more effective than a single individual incentive. However 
there are limits on the number of incentive schemes that can be combined effectively. The effects 
of mixed incentives tend to be greater in workplaces with worker discretion and task variety, 
thereby providing support for a contingency perspective.
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Introduction
An increasing proportion of companies and workplaces use multiple pay incentives for 
their employees. Nearly 40% of British workplaces were using two or more incentive 
systems by the mid-2000s compared with just over 20% two decades earlier (Pendleton 
et al., 2009: 279). This development in corporate practice is mirrored by developments 
in theory and research on incentives. Recent theory suggests that multiple incentives may 
be more productive than single incentives because the positive features of one can 
counteract negative effects of another. A wider range of incentives can spread employee 
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effort across a range of desired tasks whereas a single incentive may lead to undue focus 
on just one task. Furthermore, the addition of incentives that encourage employee com-
mitment to the company may counter the dysfunctional employee behaviour that often 
arises from individual incentives (Gibbons, 1998; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; 
Roberts, 2010).
Despite these developments in theory and practice, there is as yet very little empirical 
evidence on these issues. A key issue is whether the provision of multiple incentives does 
indeed have the beneficial company outcomes that recent theoretical contributions and 
corporate practice imply. This article provides new evidence on this issue by addressing 
several interrelated questions that have been posed in the recent literature on incentives 
theory. Do combinations of incentives have a stronger impact on productivity than a 
single incentive (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994)? Are the effects of individual incen-
tives, such as individual payment by results (IPBR), enhanced by the addition of appar-
ently weaker incentives such as group payment by results (GPBR) or profit sharing (PS)? 
Is GPBR or PS more effective in this respect, given that PS would appear to have weaker 
incentive effects, as highlighted in the financial participation literature (Weitzman and 
Kruse, 1990)?
The article addresses these questions using data from the British Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS). It examines the ‘marginal effects’ of individ-
ual schemes, and combinations of them, on workplace productivity. In the first instance, 
the effects are examined for all private sector workplaces in the survey. Then, drawing 
on contingency approaches suggesting that the effectiveness and appropriateness of pay 
systems will depend on organizational context, the effects of combinations of incentive 
systems are assessed in contrasting work settings. Specifically we evaluate whether the 
effects of multiple incentives are contingent on the extent of worker discretion and work 
variety.
The results are supportive of recent theoretical contributions, and provide a rationale 
for the growing use of multiple incentives by companies. PS in particular plays a key role 
in ‘unlocking’ positive relationships between other payment schemes and productivity, 
even though theoretically it is the weakest incentive because of free-rider effects and a 
tenuous ‘line of sight’ between individual effort and measured outcomes (Conyon and 
Freeman, 2004). Given these apparent weaknesses, we suggest that the complementary 
effects of PS derive from its capacity to engender cooperation and reciprocity (Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2002; Morris and Pinnington, 1998). We suggest that it is these ‘softer’, 
social-psychological aspects of profit sharing, along with the broader performance met-
rics in profit sharing, that mitigate potentially dysfunctional incentives in individual 
incentive schemes.
These results contribute to the literature in several ways: whereas most recent articles 
evaluating multiple incentives consider the nature and incidence of incentives and meas-
urement characteristics (e.g. Kauhanen and Napari, 2012), this article focuses on the 
important issue of outcomes. In contrast, though, to other studies examining outcomes (e.g. 
Barnes et al., 2011), our research examines effects at the workplace rather than employee 
level. The role of profit sharing in particular as a complement to other pay incentives pro-
vides a new perspective on the generally positive role of profit sharing observed over many 
years in the financial participation literature (Perotin and Robinson, 2003).
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Prior to presenting the results, the article outlines our reasoning for expecting comple-
mentary effects from multiple incentives drawing on recent theory in personnel and insti-
tutional economics. The data and methodology is then outlined, prior to presentation of 
the results. The article concludes with some observations on the limitations of this 
research and some suggestions for future research.
Background
There has been a long tradition of research into the operation and effects of incentive 
pay schemes, reflecting persistent and long-standing interest amongst companies in 
finding effective ways to enhance worker performance. Linking wage payments to 
output or results is said to provide an incentive for workers to expend greater effort and 
thereby generate higher levels of output (Prendergast, 1999). This proposition has been 
formalized in agency theory, whereby incentives reduce the agency costs of monitor-
ing worker effort and output (offset by the need to pay premiums to compensate work-
ers for risk-bearing). Recent contributions have also highlighted the sorting effects of 
IPBR: higher pay for higher effort or output will attract higher quality recruits and 
possibly shake out less productive workers (see Lazear, 2000). Nearly all of the incen-
tives literature in this tradition considers single incentive schemes, be they individual 
PBR, group PBR, profit sharing, share ownership plans, or stock options, in isolation 
from other schemes.
However, there is a growing body of theory, as yet mainly unmatched by empirical 
evidence, which suggests that multiple incentives may be more effective than single 
incentives (Gibbons, 1998; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Prendergast, 1999). The 
background to this supposition is the well-known limitations of single incentive schemes, 
especially those based on individual output or performance. The need for measurement 
and observability often complicates the design of efficient incentive contracts, which in 
turn dilutes the incentive, requires costly risk premiums, or encourages dysfunctional 
and costly worker behaviour. The measurement process itself may be costly, as exempli-
fied by ‘time and motion’ studies in traditional IPBR.
Following Gibbs et al. (2009), the issues with measurement relate to noise, distortion 
and manipulability (arising from workers’ asymmetric information). Taking each in turn, 
measurement will be noisy insofar as output is influenced by factors other than the 
employee’s effort, and it is difficult to attribute output precisely to particular workers. 
This is risky for the (risk-averse) worker/agent. Risk may be controllable/uncontrollable 
by the worker: where it is under the worker’s control, additional incentives may be nec-
essary to encourage the worker to behave appropriately (Prendergast, 2002); where it is 
not, workers will likely seek insurance (guaranteed payments for events outside their 
control) and risk premia. Agency theory predicts, therefore, a trade-off between risk and 
incentives (Prendergast, 2002), and there is evidence that incentive pay is less likely to 
be used, and less effective, when companies face higher product market risk (Bloom and 
Milkovitch, 1998: 290–291). A refinement of this argument, for which there is some 
empirical support, is that worker discretion moderates the risk–incentives relationship. 
Where workers have discretion, incentives help them to make the right choices under 
uncertainty (Devaro and Kurtulus, 2010).
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Distortion occurs where the incentive causes the worker to devote inappropriate 
effort or attention to one aspect of their job (typically the element rewarded by the 
incentive payment). This reflects the difficulty of designing measurement systems that 
adequately capture the distribution and weighting of tasks. Distortion is likely to 
increase with task range and complexity. For this reason, individual incentives may be 
less effective where workers have discretion to organize their work tasks. Individual 
incentives may also be costly where managers want workers to experiment or innovate 
because new methods are not captured by the incentive scheme (Roberts, 2010). The 
solution may be to increase the number of dimensions of measurement, which is poten-
tially costly, or else to add new types of incentive so as to encourage a spread of effort 
across the range of tasks.
Manipulation occurs where workers can exploit asymmetric information about the 
production process to secure incentive payments. Classic micro-sociological studies by 
Roy (1952) in the USA and Lupton (1963) in Britain showed how piece work gave rise 
to hoarding of output (giving workers de facto discretion over daily effort), manipulation 
of task times and restriction of effort and output. IPBR can also generate low trust, and 
hence encourage manipulation, by signalling that managers lack faith in the capability or 
motivation of workers to perform tasks or that the desired results are difficult to achieve 
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Gneezy et al., 2011). These effects in turn under-
pinned conflictual industrial relations and pervaded the conduct of collective bargaining 
(see Brown, 1973; Edwards and Scullion, 1982). There is also widespread evidence of 
other forms of individual incentives being manipulated by employees, as in the findings 
from the stock options literature that top executives manipulate the timings of stock 
option awards and ‘reload’ options when prices fall (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 
Brenner et al., 2000; Yermack, 1997).
A key element of recent incentives theory is the proposition that the addition of fur-
ther incentives can ameliorate the measurement costs associated with individual incen-
tives (Roberts, 2010). Additional incentives such as profit sharing may reduce 
manipulation by enhancing cooperation and commitment. PS may also mitigate the 
agent’s pursuit of insurance where risk is uncontrollable by signalling that employees 
will benefit from future company performance. Measurement noise may be mitigated in 
interdependent work environments by collective schemes that focus on group rather than 
individual output. Multiple incentives potentially soften distortion by rewarding a wider 
range of tasks and behaviour and limit workers’ opportunity to game incentives. For 
these reasons a mix of individual and collective, or combinations of group incentives 
may be more effective than individual incentives in many workplaces. By contrast, in 
those workplaces where measurement noise, distortion and manipulation are low 
(because tasks are repetitive, simple and independent), individual payment by results or 
single metric pay incentives may be effective on their own (cf. Gneezy et al., 2011; 
Kauhanen and Napari, 2012; Rynes et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, as has been widely observed in the literature, group-based incentives 
are not without their limitations. One, the 1/N problem means that individual employees 
may ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others. Two, the ‘line of sight’ between individual work 
behaviour and payments determined by collective outcomes can be indirect and tenuous 
(Conyon and Freeman, 2004). These limitations are likely to increase with the size of the 
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reward group, with those group-based incentives linked to company performance rather 
than group output likely to have very weak, perhaps non-existent, incentive effects 
(Prendergast, 1999; Sesil, 2006). In these terms, profit sharing is likely to have lower 
incentive power than group PBR systems because the ‘line of sight’ between individual 
effort and payments is especially indirect.
However, in practice profit sharing may be more effective than group PBR. Net meas-
urement and compliance costs in profit sharing are likely to be negligible because profits 
have to be calculated anyway for the annual company report. Furthermore, group PBR 
may have negative effects that are not usually found in profit sharing. One important 
limitation of group PBR is that work groups often develop informal norms restricting 
output, as has been observed from the Hawthorne studies onwards (Rose, 1975).
The conjunction of individual PBR with group schemes may reduce free-riding and 
may help to develop an appreciation of the ‘line of sight’ between individual and collec-
tive results by encouraging individuals to focus on linkages between their own perfor-
mance and collective outcomes. It may also deal with the sorting issue identified above. 
Against this, rewarding individual and collective performance may set up a ‘social 
dilemma’ for employees: which targets do they pursue?
Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence on the effects of multiple incentives 
despite the theoretical case for them. An early study comparing the effects of hybrid 
(individual and group) incentives against both individual and group incentives found that 
the mixed incentives performed worst (Wageman, 1995). Recent studies have used 
experimental techniques to compare individual, group and mixed incentives, and have 
found little evidence for the superior performance of mixed arrangements (Barnes et al., 
2011; Libby and Thorne, 2009). It has been argued that mixed arrangements can be con-
fusing for employees, and this detracts from any potential to get the ‘best of both worlds’. 
These studies focused on the behavioural impact of combining incentives: what has been 
missing from the literature has been an empirical assessment of the impact on company 
or workplace economic performance. Arguably, this is the ‘acid test’ of whether multiple 
incentives are worthwhile. Accordingly, this article assesses the effects of combining 
incentives on workplace productivity.
Based on the reasoning presented so far, several predictions are used to guide the 
research. One, in general, multiple incentives will be more effective than a single incen-
tive scheme in terms of affecting the probability of high levels of productivity. Two, 
more specifically, the addition of a collective incentive scheme to an individual-based 
scheme such as IPBR, or vice versa, will augment the productivity effects by more than 
the sum of the effects of the two incentive schemes. Three, based on the view that the net 
limitations of GPBR are greater than those of PS, GPBR will be less effective than PS 
when added to IPBR. Four, the combination of collective incentives such as GPBR and 
PS will be more effective than the use of IPBR by itself, highlighting the potential of 
apparently less powerful incentives to outperform individual incentives.
We further examine whether the effects of single and multiple incentive schemes are 
contingent on features of the work environment, given earlier findings on this issue 
(Belfield and Marsden, 2003: Brown, 1990). As Kauhanen and Napari (2012) point out, 
the trade-offs between risks assumed by the worker and distortion of work tasks and 
behaviour are likely to depend on job and work characteristics. In our research, the two 
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key dimensions of task design examined are the extent of employee decision rights (task 
discretion) and the range of tasks (task variety).
Where a job is ‘narrow’ in terms of task range, the narrow performance measures typi-
cally found in IPBR are less likely to lead to distorted incentives, as they may capture all 
aspects of task performance that the employee undertakes. Where there is task variety, 
the addition of incentives with a broader set of metrics can encourage workers to spread 
effort appropriately across tasks.
As for task discretion, there are divergent perspectives in the literature concerning its 
moderating effects on the relationship between incentives and productivity outcomes. 
One perspective suggests that if task discretion is found when the production system is 
characterized by uncertainty and asymmetric information, incentives may be used to 
ensure that the worker makes the right decisions and to hold her or him to account 
(Devaro and Kurtulus, 2010; Prendergast, 2002). On this basis, IPBR may be expected 
to have positive productivity effects when there is task discretion. Meanwhile, where 
worker discretion is low, individual incentives may have strong productivity effects 
because incentive payments compensate for boring, repetitive work without decision-
making powers (‘compensating differentials’).
Alternatively, IPBR may have adverse impacts by distorting the choices workers 
make where there is task discretion, and by enabling them to manipulate the incentive 
plan where they have superior information about work tasks. The worker may exploit 
discretion to pursue her or his own productivity-limiting preferences (e.g. to satisfice 
rather than optimize incentive payments), especially as individual incentives can convey 
low-trust signals from the employer (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008). If this is the 
case, the addition of other incentive systems may enhance productivity: group PBR may 
encourage cooperation with other workers (Sliwka, 2011) or impose peer pressure, whilst 
profit sharing may encourage workers with discretion to make decisions that are geared 
to bringing about good company performance.
Based on this reasoning, and the earlier discussion of relevant theory, several predic-
tions guide the analysis of contingency effects. One, individual incentives will be effec-
tive in raising the probability of high levels of productivity in work contexts characterized 
by low task variety or task discretion but not in those where there is high variety or dis-
cretion. Two, adding collective incentives to individual incentives will have a comple-
mentary effect on productivity where there is high but not low task variety or discretion. 
Three, of the two collective incentives, profit sharing will be more effective than GPBR 
in this regard. Four, combinations of ‘weak’ incentives – GPBR and PS – will be more 
effective in work settings with high variety or discretion than those with low variety or 
discretion.
Methodology
The data used to address our questions come from the Management Questionnaire of the 
British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 (WERS04). This survey pro-
vides information on a range of incentive arrangements, both individual and group, as 
well as broader information on employment relations, employment practices, workplace 
characteristics and performance measures across all sectors of the British economy. The 
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sample is confined to private sector establishments because very few public sector work-
places have PS or GPBR. With this exclusion, and after accounting for missing values, 
this gives a working sample for our productivity estimates of just over 1300 workplaces. 
With the use of survey weights to compensate for sample-selection biases and identified 
non-response biases (for more information see Kersley et al., 2006: 334–335), and the 
use of the complex survey procedures in STATA, our results are nationally representative 
of private sector workplaces with five or more employees in Britain.
Our analysis focuses on evaluating the productivity effects of different configurations 
of incentive arrangements: whether the schemes work independently, jointly, or all 
together. Our productivity equations are estimated using an ordered probit model since 
the dependent variable is composed of several categories:
       Y IPBR x GPBR x PS Controls     = ( ) +  (1)
The productivity equations include all seven possible combinations of incentives arrange-
ments – individual schemes (individual PBR, group PBR or profit sharing); joint – indi-
vidual and profit sharing, individual and group, profit sharing and group; and the 
coexistence of all schemes. We further model the productive impact of multi-incentives 
according to different elements of the work environment; namely the extent to which 
largest occupational grouping has variety in their work and discretion over how they do 
their work. A series of four-way interaction models are run whereby the pay scheme 
interactions are supplemented by interactions using dummies to record whether work-
places have ‘high’ or ‘low’ levels of task variety and discretion.
The dependent variable is based on respondents’ assessment of the labour productiv-
ity of the establishment relative to other workplaces in the same industry. Respondents 
are asked to rate their establishment’s performance in terms of five, ordered categories 
ranging from ‘a lot below average’ to ‘a lot above average’. Overall, 52% of workplaces 
report ‘above’ or ‘a lot above average’ productivity, with most of the remainder reporting 
average productivity (42%). Much of our attention focuses on the 10% of workplaces 
whose labour productivity is ‘a lot above average’ (i.e. the best performing workplaces). 
Subjective performance measures of this type have been the subject of much debate and 
several investigations into their reliability and validity in the WERS series. These inves-
tigations have shown that these subjective measures have clear and reasonably strong 
associations with alternative objective measures of performance, and both types have 
been found to have similar associations with a range of independent variables (Haskel, 
2005; Machin and Stewart, 1996; Wall et al., 2004).1 Furthermore, the explicit reference 
to performance relative to that in similar firms normalizes productivity performance in a 
way that can be challenging when objective measures of performance are used. Thus, we 
have reasonable confidence that our variable provides a valid and acceptable measure of 
productivity.
The key independent variables in the analysis relate to various forms of incentive pay 
in which employees participate and have recently received payments. Individual PBR 
records the presence of a scheme which is based on individual performance or output. 
Group PBR records the presence of one that is linked to measures of team, workplace, or 
organizational performance. The definition of performance in the survey is a quantitative 
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or objective one, and is clearly differentiated from subjective evaluations of perfor-
mance. Profit sharing records the use of profit-related payments or bonuses to any 
employees in the workplace. This is an incentive scheme that is a form of group-based 
incentive but is differentiated from the other group incentive by its broader performance 
metric. In fact, the question relating to Group PBR explicitly excludes profit-related pay-
ments. Each of these variables is coded on a 0,1 basis capturing the incidence of each 
type of incentive arrangement, and of groupings of schemes (see Table 1).2 Whilst the 
evidence suggests that each form of incentive pay is found in around one in five work-
places, this masks a more complex and nuanced configuration of incentives within firms. 
In all instances, the schemes are just as likely to operate alongside other incentive 
schemes as in isolation. Profit sharing is the most likely to exist alone but is also a wide-
spread complement of both IPBR and GPBR. Indeed both individual and collective 
forms of PBR are more likely to exist with one or two other incentive arrangements than 
by themselves.
A key issue concerns the coverage of these schemes given the posited effects on work-
place performance. Data on coverage indicate that individual incentives cover around 
half or more of the workforce in 61% of workplaces, whilst GPBR and PS cover the 
majority (60% plus) in 84% of cases. Thus, in the majority of cases most workers are 
covered by the incentive schemes in question.
In all specifications we control for a range of variables that might independently 
affect the level of labour productivity (see Appendix for further details on variable con-
struction). Thus we include controls for organizational size (Medium Organization, 
Large Organization and Very Large Organization), workplace age (Age) and for 
Workplace Size. We control for Workforce Composition using the percentage of blue-
collar workers in the workplace, and for the extent of Training using two dummies relat-
ing to the number of days of training provided per employee. We include a measure of 
Product Market Competition because this may influence the use of multiple incentives 
Table 1. The incidence of multi-incentives (weighted percentage of workplaces).
Incentive arrangement Weighted mean
Individual PBR 19.57
Group PBR 22.39
Profit sharing 19.30
Of which:  
One scheme only  
 Individual PBR 6.83
 Group PBR 6.90
 Profit sharing 9.80
Two schemes  
 Individual × Group PBR 7.07
 Individual PBR × PS 1.03
 Group PBR × PS 3.77
All three incentives 4.69
Total workplaces with incentives 40.01%
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(see Pendleton et al., 2009) and it may affect the size of risk premiums that often accom-
pany incentive schemes (Bloom and Milkovitch, 1998). A dummy variable records Trade 
Union Recognition and, since earlier work shows that employee involvement practices 
can affect productivity (Pendleton and Robinson, 2010), a measure for Involvement 
Practices is used (based on an additive scale of the number of direct involvement prac-
tices in the workplace). The use of subjectively determined Merit Pay is entered as a 
control. This does not form a more substantial part of the analysis because it is conceptu-
ally distinct from the objective variable pay schemes that are the primary focus: the latter 
provide supplementary bonus payments based on objective performance measures 
whereas merit pay is usually based on subjective performance evaluations and in Britain 
is typically incorporated into base pay (as additional increments or increases within sal-
ary ranges). Finally, the regressions include a set of 11 industry dummies based on the 12 
main industry sectors in the British Standard Occupational Classification 2003.3
In reporting our estimation results we note that the conventional output of limited 
dependent estimations (coefficients and standard errors) is not that insightful where the 
dependent variable is ordered and models involve numerous interaction terms. A more 
meaningful interpretation and understanding of the underlying relationships in such 
models need to be based on the reporting of marginal effects or predicted probabilities 
of the different incentive packages, as these can differ in direction, size and statistical 
significance from the traditionally reported output of coefficients and standard errors 
(Norton et al., 2004). We therefore use the STATA margins command to calculate and 
report predicted probabilities and marginal effects. In each case these results relate to 
the best performing workplaces (those that report ‘a lot better than average’ labour 
productivity).
Results
The output of the various stages of our analysis is reported in Tables 2 through 5. All 
models are well specified and provide good explanatory power, as indicated by signifi-
cant F statistics.4 Across all models our list of control variables reveals statistically sig-
nificant associations with our productivity measure (see Table 2, left hand column). 
Trade union recognition and larger organizations are associated with lower comparative 
productivity but training and merit pay are positively associated with the best performing 
firms. Neither employee involvement practices nor the skills composition of the work-
force are significantly associated with labour productivity.
As with previous analysis of incentive arrangements, our baseline ordered probit 
model reports the independent effects of our incentive arrangements on labour produc-
tivity (see Table 2). However in order to provide a clearer picture of the magnitude and 
effectiveness of these incentive arrangements we calculate predicted probabilities for the 
different outcomes and the resultant marginal effects of these ‘independent’ incentive 
arrangements (see Table 3). What emerges supports the contention that some group 
incentives outperform individual incentives. IPBR schemes marginally outperform the 
likelihood of reporting the highest level of productivity relative to workplaces without 
such arrangements (11.75% as against 10.43%) giving a small positive but statistically 
insignificant marginal effect (the difference between the two predicted probabilities) of 
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just over 1%. Workplaces with GPBR schemes fair even worse showing a lower proba-
bility of reporting the top level of labour productivity relative to workplaces without 
these arrangements (9.18% vs 11.15%), although the negative marginal effect is not sta-
tistically significant. Conversely, PS, apparently the ‘weakest’ of our incentive schemes 
in terms of incentive effects, is the only arrangement to show a statistically significant 
productivity enhancing effect, indicating that on average having such an arrangement 
will increase the probability of reporting ‘a lot better than average productivity’ by more 
than 5 percentage points compared to non-PS firms.
Table 2. Ordered probit estimates of ‘independent’ and multi-incentive effects on labour 
productivity.
Independent variables Independent Multi-incentive
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Incentive arrangements  
 Individual PBR 0.0751 (0.1589) −0.1120 (0.2388)
 Group PBR −0.1196 (0.1373) −0.4249*** (0.1640)
 Profit sharing 0.2806** (0.1360) 0.1464 (0.1847)
 Individual × Group 0.6680** (0.3178)
 Individual × Profit sharing 0.9249 (0.6342)
 Group × Profit sharing 0.8470** (0.3417)
 Ind. × Group × Profit sharing −2.0451*** (0.7420)
Controls  
 Merit pay 0.3273** (0.1473) 0.3010** (0.1487)
 Involvement practices 0.0255 (0.0288) 0.0254 (0.0285)
 Trade union recognition −0.2884** (0.1329) −0.2857** (0.1349)
 Workforce composition 0.0020 (0.0020) 0.0022 (0.0020)
 Prod. market competition 0.0512 (0.1031) 0.0390 (0.1001)
 Age 0.0020*** (0.0007) 0.0020*** (0.0007)
 [Training 0–2 days]  
 Training (2–5 days) 0.3034** (0.1491) 0.3216** (0.1444)
 Training (5 or more days) 0.4351*** (0.1454) 0.4510*** (0.1435)
 Workplace size −0.0003 (0.0002) −0.0003* (0.0002)
 [Small org.]  
 Medium organization −0.3041* (0.1633) −0.2966* (0.1671)
 Large organization −0.1782 (0.1803) −0.1613 (0.1804)
 Very large organization −0.3761** (0.1828) −0.3750** (0.1807)
 Industry dummies Yes Yes  
 Cut1/ −2.1593*** (0.3154) −2.1669*** (0.3187)
 Cut2/ −1.0339*** (0.2139) −1.0371*** (0.2063)
 Cut3/ 0.5114** (0.2091) 0.5239*** (0.2017)
 Cut4/ 1.9201*** (0.2231) 1.9514*** (0.2154)
 F 3.15*** 3.23***  
 N 1303 1303  
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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However, more often than not these schemes do not operate in isolation, thus ques-
tioning whether these results provide a true and fair representation of the effectiveness of 
these incentive schemes. As we will see, analysis of the configuration of incentive 
arrangements portrayed in Table 1 reveals a whole new story.
Multiple incentives
Following the format of our baseline model we report the coefficients and standard errors 
of our interaction model (Table 2, right hand column) and then calculate the predicted 
probabilities of reporting the highest level of labour productivity for all combinations of 
incentive schemes (see Table 4). In order to assess the extent to which the different incen-
tive packages are performance enhancing, we can compare the predicted probability of 
each arrangement against a comparator workplace – those with no incentive arrange-
ments (the first line in Table 4). Instances where these differences are statistically signifi-
cant are reported in the table.
The productivity of our three incentive schemes varies according to whether they 
operate alone or alongside other incentives. Schemes operated in isolation show fairly 
small differences in the predicted probabilities of achieving the highest levels of produc-
tivity from those workplaces with no incentive arrangements – our comparator group. 
Combining two types of incentive arrangements reveal the most positive performance 
enhancing effects, but increasing this number to all three incentive schemes reduces the 
predicted probability of achieving very high productivity back to the level of the com-
parator group (i.e. no schemes).
With regard to stand-alone schemes, our labour productivity estimates reveal that PS 
works somewhat better whilst IPBR and GPBR perform less well than the comparator 
group. This is most marked in the case of GPBR which has only a 4.7% probability of 
reporting ‘a lot better than average’ productivity as against the 10% for workplaces with 
no incentive schemes (the difference being statistically significant at 0.01). The predicted 
probability of achieving the highest level of productivity with IPBR is somewhat lower 
than the comparator group (8% vs 10%), highlighting the potential limitations of this type 
Table 3. Independent incentive arrangements: predicted probabilities of achieving highest level 
of labour productivity.
Incentive arrangement
 
Coeff. Labour productivity Marginal
effect
Incentive
absent
Incentive
present
Individual PBR 0.0751 0.1043*** 0.1175*** 0.0132
 (0.1589) (0.0148) (0.0280) (0.0288)
Group PBR −0.1196 0.1115*** 0.0918*** −0.0198
 (0.1373) (0.0161) (0.0194) (0.0222)
Profit sharing 0.2806** 0.0968*** 0.1499*** 0.0531*
 (0.1360) (0.0137) (0.0304) (0.0287)
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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of incentive.5 Where collective incentives complement IPBR the predicted probabilities 
of the highest level of productivity increase: in the case of GPBR the effect approximates 
to the additive effect of IPBR and GPBR, whereas there is a substantial increase when PS 
is combined with IPBR (35%). Thus, our first prediction is mainly but not fully borne out. 
Multiple incentives are more effective than a single incentive except where profit sharing 
is used on its own. The second prediction is met in that the addition of a collective incen-
tive to an individual incentive increases the effects of the latter. The third prediction, that 
PS will be more effective than GPBR in this respect, is also borne out.
A notable finding is that the combination of GPBR and PS is an effective one. The 
predicted probability of the highest level of productivity is 23% (significant at 0.01). 
This exceeds the probability where there are no schemes at all (10%) and where IPBR is 
in operation (8%). This lends credence to Roberts’s (2010) view that a combination of 
apparently ‘weak’ incentives can be more effective than a single, individual-based incen-
tive. Thus, the fourth prediction is realized in our results.
Extrapolating from these results, the role and effect of PS stands out. When combined 
with either IPBR or GPBR, there is a substantial increase in the predicted probability of 
the highest levels of labour productivity. This is consistent with some experimental 
results relating to the effects of combining profit sharing and individual incentives on 
individual performance (Bellemare and Shearer, 2009). The significant productivity 
effects of adding profit sharing are perhaps surprising given that PS appears to have very 
weak direct incentive effects due to the potential for free-riding (Prendergast, 1999). 
However, if PS is viewed as embodying gift-like features, bearing in mind that PS pay-
ments tend to be infrequent and usually un-contracted, the results are far more explica-
ble. If PS establishes relationships of reciprocity between employees and employer, 
through its contribution to perceptions of organizational justice (Coyle-Shapiro et al., 
2002), prior tendencies to restrict effort and free-ride may well be mitigated (Dodlova 
and Yudkevich, 2009). It may also weaken any tendencies towards manipulation of 
Table 4. Multi-incentive arrangements: predicted probabilities of achieving highest level of 
labour productivity.
Incentive arrangement Predicted
probability
SE Wald test
Individual
PBR
Group
PBR
Profit
sharing
F statistic
0 0 0 0.1002*** (0.0156) [Comparator category]
1 0 0 0.0830** (0.0341) 0.25
0 1 0 0.0468*** (0.0149) 8.46***
0 0 1 0.1265*** (0.0358) 0.55
1 1 0 0.1236*** (0.0323) 0.50
1 0 1 0.3532* (0.1997) 1.60
0 1 1 0.2280*** (0.0762) 2.85*
1 1 1 0.1009*** (0.0371) 0.00
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Wald test for significant difference between low and high categories.
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asymmetric information (Fehr and Gachter, 2000), thereby also helping to account for 
the positive effects of the PS–IPBR combination. However, reciprocity may be under-
mined when contracted incentives predominate – this may explain why the use of all 
three incentive schemes, including PS, has very weak effects on productivity compared 
with using no schemes at all.
Multiple incentives and the work environment
Much of the previous literature on incentives recognizes the contingent role of work 
settings in influencing the appropriateness and effects of incentives. For instance, where 
workers have high levels of task discretion individual incentives may be less effective 
because of the capacity of workers to manipulate the scheme. To investigate the role of 
work contexts further we replicate the analysis to distinguish between situations where 
there is high and low task discretion and variety. To do this we add an additional interac-
tion term to our previous analysis based on three-way interactions. The various combi-
nations of incentive schemes are further interacted with the dummy measures for each 
work context. This analysis around the work environment provides a more nuanced 
interpretation of the aforementioned results in situations where the scope for noise, 
distortion and manipulation may arise. For each job characteristic – task variety and 
discretion – we report the predicted probability of reporting ‘best performance’ for each 
incentive combination depending upon whether they operate where the characteristics 
are deemed ‘low’ or ‘high’ (see Table 5). In an earlier analysis, we also investigated 
these effects by splitting the sample by these work characteristics: the results were 
qualitatively very similar.
The effects match expectations especially in the case of task discretion. Stand-out 
results relate to the efficacy of incentive arrangements involving IPBR. These strongest 
of incentives appear to work particularly well by themselves where workers have less 
discretion over how they do their work and thus little scope for distortion and manipula-
tion. In such instances they have a 22% probability of being amongst the most productive 
workplaces, though a caveat is that this result is not significant at 10% (it is significant 
at this level in the unreported split-sample results). Conversely, IPBR performs less well 
than ‘no incentives’ where there is scope (high task discretion) for employees to make 
decisions which reflect their preferences and which may well reflect the measurement 
limitations of IPBR schemes. These results conflict with the argument made by some 
(e.g. Devaro and Kurtulus, 2010) that IPBR ought to be effective in these circumstances 
because it encourages employees to make the right choices. Seemingly, these effects can 
be overcome with the addition of PS and, to a much lesser extent, GPBR. This comple-
mentarity lifts the predicted probability of reporting a lot better than average productivity 
to 51% and 12% respectively when task discretion is high.
Indeed, most of the best performing incentive arrangements are evident where work-
ers have some freedom to choose what they do and how they do it. The broader metrics 
and attitudinal potential of PS seem to thrive under these conditions whether PS is oper-
ated in isolation or alongside PBR – individual and collective. There is a 15% probability 
of the highest levels of productivity where PS is used (compared with 11% where there 
is no scheme of any sort) but this increases to 31% when used in combination with 
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GPBR. In each instance, the individual and combined effects of PS are much higher than 
in low discretion workplaces where this sort of incentive seems less appropriate. 
However, GPBR schemes by themselves are ineffective in these circumstances, with a 
lower predicted probability of high productivity where there is high job discretion than 
low discretion (it is also lower than where there is no scheme at all). It is possible that 
there is greater capacity for the weaknesses of collective schemes, such as free-riding 
and group norms restricting output, to come to the fore when workers have greater free-
dom to organize their work. In these circumstances, the reciprocity-inducing characteris-
tics of profit sharing may come to the rescue, with a substantial and significant 
enhancement of the probability of high productivity being observed where PS and GPBR 
are combined. However, even the efficacy of PS can be undermined when there are a 
large number of incentive schemes: the predicted probability of high productivity is 
lower when all three schemes are present than when there are no schemes at all. The 
reduced effectiveness of PS is consistent with Fehr and Gachter’s (2000) argument that 
reciprocity can be crowded out by explicit incentives. Conversely, all three schemes are 
significantly more effective in low discretion environments suggesting that a wealth of 
incentives may compensate for boring work without decision-making powers.
Table 5. Multi-incentive arrangements and job characteristics: predicted probabilities of 
achieving the highest level of labour productivity.
Incentive arrangement Task variety Wald test Task discretion Wald test
 Low High F Low High F
 
 
Predicted
probability
(SE)
Predicted
probability
(SE)
Predicted
probability
(SE)
Predicted
probability
(SE)
 
Individual Group Profit  
PBR PBR Sharing  
0 0 0 0.0632*** 0.1073*** 4.09** 0.0767*** 0.1052*** 2.06
 (0.0201) (0.0172) (0.0191) (0.0174)
1 0 0 0.2531** 0.0667** 2.41 0.2249 0.0538** 0.94
 (0.1174) (0.0313) (0.1748) (0.0243)
0 1 0 0.0834** 0.0369*** 1.22 0.0514** 0.0411*** 0.14
 (0.0418) (0.0133) (0.0252) (0.0156)
0 0 1 0.0825 0.1287*** 0.25 0.0749* 0.1543*** 1.81
 (0.0857) (0.0379) (0.0388) (0.0490)
1 1 0 0.2245 0.1149*** 0.40 0.1211* 0.1175*** 0.00
 (0.1705) (0.0318) (0.0687) (0.0347)
1 0 1 0.3355*** 0.3521* 0.01 0.0120 0.5096** 6.13**
 (0.0675) (0.2114) (0.0227) (0.2002)
0 1 1 0.0784** 0.2799*** 4.29** 0.1104 0.3144*** 2.80*
 (0.0309) (0.0956) (0.0838) (0.0914)
1 1 1 0.0933* 0.0980*** 0.01 0.2177*** 0.0740** 2.95*
 (0.0490) (0.0376) (0.0781) (0.0346)
 F 3.78*** 3.34***  
 N 1302 1302  
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Turning to task variety, the pattern of incentive effects is similar. In line with predic-
tions, IPBR is highly effective in low task variety work settings (as indicated by a sub-
stantial improvement in the predicted probability of the highest levels of labour 
productivity compared with where incentive schemes are absent). The addition of GPBR 
and PS has no effect in the case of the former and a simple additive effect in that of the 
latter. In high variety work contexts, the results are rather different. Here, as predicted, 
IPBR has an adverse effect on the probability of very high productivity. Combining 
IPBR with GPBR has a small complementary effect whilst the combination of IPBR and 
PS has a substantial effect (as does the combination of GPBR and PS). The combination 
of PS and IPBR, however, works well in both settings possibly by encouraging appropri-
ate allocations of effort in high variety work environments and by ‘softening’ the hard 
edges of performance management in low variety contexts. Combinations of GPBR and 
PS work very well in high variety settings, but not where there is low variety. The use of 
all three schemes has small negative effects in high variety workplaces and small posi-
tive effects where there is little variety.
In summary, the results for task variety and discretion support our predictions as fol-
lows. One, individual incentives are indeed effective where there is low task variety or 
discretion, and harmful where there is high task variety or discretion. Two, adding a col-
lective incentive to an individual incentive has complementary effects where there is high 
task variety or discretion but it diminishes the effectiveness of individual incentives in 
workplaces with low task variety or discretion. Three, as predicted, profit sharing is more 
effective than GPBR in this respect in both high task variety and high discretion work-
places. Four, combinations of so-called ‘weak’ incentives (profit sharing and other group 
incentives) are ineffective where there is low task variety or discretion but are effective in 
raising the probability of reporting high productivity where there is high variety or discre-
tion. There is therefore a clear contingency dimension to our results: the nature of the 
work environment moderates the effects of incentives and combinations of them.
Discussion and conclusions
In the article we posed three questions about the operation of incentives and combina-
tions of them. The first enquired whether combinations of incentives have a stronger 
impact on productivity than single incentives. The answer is yes in most, but not all, 
instances. The second question asked more specifically about the addition of group to 
individual incentives. Here it was found that the productivity effects of IPBR are 
increased when group incentives are added but the difference is not very large when it is 
GPBR that is added. The effects are very much larger when it is PS that is added, and this 
provides an answer to the third question about the relative efficacy of GPBR and PS. Our 
results show clearly that PS has stronger effects. This also applies to the use of these 
schemes in isolation: in general PS works better. A further result of interest is that there 
seems to be an optimal number of incentives schemes. Our findings show that the use of 
all three incentives has negligible effects compared with using no schemes at all.
Overall, our results provide empirical support for recent theory on the power and 
nature of incentives. Individual incentives can have negative effects but these can be 
mitigated by the addition of group schemes with apparently weaker incentive power 
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(Gibbons, 1998; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). We suggest that the capacity of the 
group incentives to mitigate the dysfunctional effects of higher powered incentives by 
reducing distortion and manipulation is likely to be important here. Recent theory has 
also suggested that weak incentives are likely to be optimal in certain work environ-
ments, such as where there is multi-tasking (Roberts, 2010). Our results are mainly con-
sistent with these claims. For instance, IPBR has negative effects in high discretion work 
settings but these become mildly positive when GPBR is added and strongly positive 
when profit sharing is added. By contrast, where there is low task discretion there is 
evidence that IPBR may be effective on its own, presumably because there is limited 
noise and little opportunity for distortion and manipulation. Our results contrast with 
recent findings in the literature that suggest that individual incentives can be effective 
where there is task discretion because they encourage workers to make the right decision 
(Devaro and Kurtulus, 2010).
One important aspect of the results is that GPBR is indeed weak when operated on its 
own (cf. Sesil, 2006). GPBR has weaker effects than PS, when operated singly or in 
conjunction with IPBR. On the surface this is surprising because the incentive effects of 
PS would appear to be weaker than GPBR for a variety of reasons such as irregularity of 
payments and weak linkages to individual behaviour. It becomes easier to explain if PS 
is viewed as means of generating reciprocity between employees and the firm (Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2002). As with employee share ownership, it can signal management’s 
good intentions to the workforce. The trust and commitment this generates may dampen 
the dysfunctional effects that can arise from the use of individual incentives, thereby 
explaining why the productivity effects are so much larger when PS is combined with 
IPBR. Although the financial participation literature has shown that profit sharing has 
positive effects on productivity, it has so far considered these effects in isolation from 
other incentive schemes (see Perotin and Robinson, 2003). Our findings therefore gener-
ate new and interesting insights into the effects of profit sharing. Future research might 
explore and test these relationships further, perhaps using employee-level data.
We are acutely conscious that our research only goes so far in investigating comple-
mentarities between forms of incentive pay, and that further research is necessary to 
clarify a range of issues. For instance, we need to know more about the balance of posi-
tive and negative effects of specific types of incentive, and how these interact with those 
of other incentives. This inevitably means that we need to observe the characteristics of 
schemes more fully, including the gearing and the performance metrics. Worker behav-
iour, as has been observed over the years in a succession of rich case studies, is also 
highly relevant. Unfortunately, we do not have this information in our data source, and 
we have had to make several important assumptions about how schemes operate and the 
strength of their effects, positive and negative.
The data source has also been criticized for its cross-sectional nature and the use of 
subjective evaluations of workplace performance. However, WERS has been extensively 
used to investigate the effects of human resources and labour practices, and it is generally 
thought that the design strengths of the survey outweigh these limitations (Brown and 
Edwards, 2009). In regard to these two specific limitations, the extant evidence from 
panel-based studies is consistent with the direction of causality postulated here (Heywood 
et al., 2002; Jones and Kato, 1995; Kruse, 1993), whilst extensive evaluation of the 
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subjective performance measures has found them to correlate satisfactorily with more 
objective measures (Haskel, 2005; Wall et al., 2004).
As is common in research of this type, there is always the potential for endogeneity to 
bias the observed effects. Unfortunately, responding to this potential problem is not at all 
straightforward given the nature of the variables and the data in the survey. Endogeneity 
may take two forms in our research: the key dependent and independent variables may 
influence each other simultaneously, and omitted variables may bias the effects of key 
independent variables through their influence on the error term. Whilst it is now possible 
to deal with endogeneity where there is a binary dependent variable by using instrumen-
tal variables and two stage regression procedures, it is not feasible to use standard instru-
mental variable procedures where the dependent variable takes an ordered, categorical 
form. A further significant problem, as noted by Conyon and Freeman (2004), is the 
identification of suitable instruments given that many of the WERS survey questions are 
on connected themes. In the survey there are no suitable measures that correlate highly 
with the key independent variables but not the dependent variable. Conceptually, if there 
is an important omitted variable in our analysis, it is probably management quality as this 
may simultaneously affect both productivity and the decision to use incentive schemes. 
As a somewhat imperfect substitute, we experiment with inserting an additional control 
that may proxy for management quality (whether the manager responsible for employee 
relations has a formal HR qualification) in the main stage regressions, but the influence 
of this on the model and the magnitude of the pay system effects is negligible.6
Even with the limitations outlined above, we believe that our study makes a valuable 
contribution to the study of multiple incentives. The research has provided empirical 
support for several important ideas on incentives that have currency in personnel and 
institutional economics. An important finding for the literature is that some mixed incen-
tives do indeed give the ‘best of both worlds’ though others do not. We have highlighted 
the role of profit sharing in this respect. Our findings add to a growing strand of literature 
which suggests that behavioural insights need to be added to the standard agency model 
to fully understand the operation and effects of contingent rewards (Ellingsen and 
Johannesson, 2008; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). It has also provided a new angle 
on human resource management complementarities, given that the literature to date has 
mainly examined relationships between incentive schemes and other HR practices rather 
than with each other. Finally, the results provide an economic rationale for the wide-
spread and growing use of multiple incentives in British workplaces.
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Notes
1. WERS04 included objective measures of performance but their use in the current study is 
precluded by limitations in these data. Only a minority of trading workplaces completed 
the relevant questionnaire, and not all of these based their answers on the workplace (Forth 
and McNabb, 2008). Resulting sample attrition would have made the research unworkable 
because of the very small number of cases left in some pay scheme categories. Using sub-
jective productivity data was judged to be reasonable in the circumstances if by no means 
ideal.
2. Ideally we would use more qualitative measures of these variable pay systems such as the 
number of employees covered by them. Although WERS asks about the proportion of the 
non-managerial workforce who received payments in the previous year, we cannot use 
this information because it does not differentiate between individual and collective PBR. 
However, it is worth noting that overall over 60% of employees have received payments from 
some scheme in the previous year in over 60% of workplaces.
3. Initially we experimented with inclusion of a control for foreign ownership but this was 
always insignificant and had no appreciable impact on model fit or other coefficients. We 
therefore excluded it from the reported models.
4. Pseudo R2 and the likelihood ratio test are not appropriate when weighted data are used with 
the svy command in STATA.
5. It is important to note that splitting the individual PBR variable by coverage indicates that the 
more workers are covered by the scheme the more negative the effects on productivity. This 
is consistent with the argument that individual incentives generate dysfunctional employee 
behaviour.
6. The results are not shown here for reasons of brevity but are available from the authors on 
request.
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Appendix
Table A1. Variables.
Variable name Variable type Mean
Individual performance 
pay
Workplace has a payment by results scheme based on 
individual performance/output in which non-managerial 
employees have received payment (1/0)
0.1957
Group performance 
pay
Workplace has a payment by results scheme based on 
group/workplace/organizational measures in which non-
managerial employees have received payment (1/0)
0.2239
Profit sharing Workplace has a profit sharing scheme in which non-
managerial employees have received payment in the 
past 12 months (1/0)
0.1930
Control variables  
Merit pay Workplace has a merit pay system in which non-
managerial employees participate (1/0)
0.1445
Involvement practices Additive scale of the number of direct involvement 
schemes in operation in each workplace (meetings 
between senior management and entire workforce + 
team briefings + quality circles + surveys + suggestion 
schemes + management chain (systematic cascading of 
information) + notice board + newsletter)
3.61
Trade union 
recognition
Trade union is recognized by management for 
negotiating pay and conditions (1/0)
0.1540
Blue-collar workers (%) Proportion of the workforce who are ‘blue-collar’ 
workers
21.86
Competition Workplace faces a very high degree of product market 
competition (1/0)
0.3890
Training (2–5) Majority of the largest occupational group receive 
between 2 and 5 days training per year (1/0)
0.1653
Training (5 or more) Majority of the largest occupational group receive 5 or 
more days training per year (1/0)
0.1202
Workplace size Number of employees in the workplace 28.21
Medium-sized 
organization
Organization as a whole has between 250 and 999 
employees (1/0)
0.0645
Large organization Organization as a whole has between 1000 and 4999 
employees (1/0)
0.1157
Very large organization Organization as a whole has more than 5000 employees 
(1/0)
0.2254
Age Age of the workplace (years) 30.76
Job characteristics  
Task variety To what extent does the largest occupational group 
(LOG) have variety in how they do their work (1/0) 
(High = Some/a lot; Low = Little/none)
0.8397
Task discretion To what extent does the LOG have discretion over 
how they do their work (1/0) (High = Some/a lot;  
Low = Little/none)
0.7083
